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ABSTRACT 
Background and Review of Na tional Labor Relations Board am 
Court Decisions in the Area of Managements 
Prerogatives - The Darlington 
and General Cases 
by 
Charles 1-1, Bullen, Jr, 
Utah State University, 1967 
Major Professor: E. B. Murray 
Department : Economics 
The effects of the Darlington case on managements prerogatives 
was that it spelled out what a multi-plant em}:lloter ii!Ust do in the 
area of plant closure to avoid violating the National Labor Relations 
Act of 1935 . There was also good evidence brought forth to show that 
management is now bargaining plant closures with union. Thus the 
conclusion was made that in the area multi-plant employers had lost 
some power due to the Darlington Case, 
The General Case is presently in the Courts and until a final 
court decision is made it is hard to say what effect it will have on 
managements prerogatives, 
(76 pages) 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Statement on Management's Prerogatives 
In recent years the National labor Relations Board and the Federal 
Courts have made decisions in the area of managements' right to manage-
ment. These decisions have brought forth some new interpretations of 
the National labor Relations Act of 1935, as amended, concerning manage-
ment's prerogatives in dealing with organized labor. 
Nature of Problem 
As a result of these decisions , a great deal of public controversy 
has persisted concerning their intent. One side states that management 
has misused its power and that the National labor Relations Board is 
right in curbing management' s misused power. The other side believes 
that the National labor -Relations Board has made rulings in areas where 
it has no business, thereby diminishing management's prerogatives to 
manage . 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this investigation will be to answer the following 
questions : 
First, what have the National labor Relations Board and Federal 
Courts really said in their respective decisions in the areas of plant 
closure and overall bargaining procedures (Boulwarism) 7 
Second, have t hese decisions weakened management's prerogatives in 
deali ng with organized labor , and if so, t o what extent? 
Third, what i s t he controversy centered around ? 
2 
Fourth, to gi ve addi t i onal i nsi ghts into the historical background of 
management 1 s prerogati ves . 
Hethod of Investigation 
This investigation will fi r s t look at the history of the labor 
movement, and then review the laws that make up the rules by which labor 
and management must abi de. It l<.lll also examine the decisions of the 
Federal Courts and the National Labor Relations Board to see exactly 
wlw. t ha s l:n~en stated in reoent oontrove:rs;l.al deci~:l.ons. This analysis 
of the decisions i s made to point out the more relevant facts that have 
led to the contrasting views and will be carried out by library-research 
s tudy. An analysis will also be made of both sides of the controversies 
to point out t he areas of contention . From these investigations, an 
attempt will be made to show where the Nati onal Labor Relations Board 
a nd the courts have placed management' s prerogatives . 
Limitations of the Study 
If the above pr ocedures were f ollowed in covering all areas of recent 
controversy over decisions concerning labor law, the limited time given 
to write this paper would not be sufficient. Thus, two areas of major 
controversy have been chosen; they are plant closing, and a company's 
overall approach to bargaining. In the former area the Darlington case 
is the key i n a series of cases. In the latter the General Electric 
case has been chosen. 
J 
Such important area s of controversy a s the subcontracting of wor k , 
as set forth in the Fiberboard case; and the ability of labor-management 
to enforce contracts, as set forth i n both the Westinghouse ca se and the 
Lincoln Mills case, will not be discussed in this paper even though they 
are of importance. 
It should also be stated that although there is considerable attention 
given to the basic statutes that concern themselves with labor relations, 
the statut es are much more involved and no attempt is made to give a 
complete analysis of them. There are also several statutes that in one 
way or another pertain to labor, but only those that concern labor-manage-
ment relations are taken into consideration in the paper. 
CHAPTER II 
HISTORY 
A history of managements prerogatives in labor negotiation could 
start as far back as 1200 B. C. and perhaps farther, but one of the most 
widely read early labor disputes took place in Egypt in about 1200 B. C. 
and a written account i s in the King James Bible. 1 This dispute arose 
out of the Pharaoh ' s command t hat the Israelites be given no more straw 
to make brick; that they should go out and get the straw and not have it 
given to them, but by the same token brick productions were to remain the 
same. Thus, the Israel1tes were to ta~e over anothe~ step in the pro~ 
duction of brick and k&ep the quantity at the same l&vel. At this the 
leader of the Israelites went to t he Pharaoh's taskmasters and said the 
work was too much. For this they were beaten and could have been killed. 
One can easily see that in this l abor dispute management had the upper 
hand. The main prerogative in this case, as in most disagreements 
between mas ter and slave, was how harsh the punishment should be. Perhaps 
the reason why more slaves were not killed was that it was hard to get 
good slaves . 
Slavery i s perhaps the crudest form of labor-management relations 
because, as stated above, the sl ave bad little or no say in the way his 
life was to be conducted. Slavery started in very early times, and it is 
1The Holy Bible: (King James Version) {Salt Lake City, Utah: The 
Deseret Book Company, 1954), p. 80 . 
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also interes ting to note tha t in ancient civilization slaves were rarely 
used i n the fields . They lived i n town and were used for the mai n part 
as domestic servants and artisans.2 Slaves could gain their freedom 
through hard work and some did . Slavery continued from these early times 
through to the period of the Roman Empire, at which time it all but died 
out, 
Slavery did not begin again on any great scale until 1441 when the 
Portuguese began bringing back slaves from Africa to work in the fields 
of the homel and. J This slavery continued in Europe and spread to the 
Ameri can colonies of England in 161 9 when twenty Negroes were sold to 
Jamestown colonists .4 Slaves did not appear in any great number in this 
country until the 1680•s and the number continued to grow for the next 
one hundred and forty years , By 1870 the Negroes in this country were 
estimated at 460,000 or about 20 per cent of the total population.5 In 
1815 the slave trade became illegal in Europe at the Congress of Vienna , 
and slavery was slowly done away with in European colonies thereafter. 
The slavery in this country remained until 1864. Slaves in the 
United States were the property of the owner and could be bought and 
sold at will and put to whatever use the mas ter saw fit. This is a far 
cry from the r ights that labor has today. 
2Ches t er G. Starr, Charles E. Nowell, Bryce Lyon, Raymond P. Stearns, 
and Theodore S. Hamerow, A History of the World (Chicago, Illinois : Rand 
McNally and Company, 1960), p. 28 . 
J shepard Bancroft Clough and Charles Wodsey Cole , Economic History of 
Europe (Boston, Massachusetts : D. C, Heath and Company, 1932), p, 1o7. 
4Arthur Cecil Bining and Thomas C. Cochran, The Rise of American 
Economic Life (New York, New York: Charles Scribrier's Sons, 1964), 
pp. 65-66. 
5Ibid., p. 29 . 
Lords and Serfs 
The next form of labor management relations to come along after 
slavery was the serf-lord relationship. The serf was not much better 
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off than a slave for he was tied to the land. Serfs did have some rights, 
and many serfs owned land, but the greatest part of the land belonged to 
the lord of the manor. The serf would do so much work for the lord, and 
in turn the lord would provide the serf with protection and use of some 
of his land. This type of relati onship between labor and management 
existed from about .500 A. D. to 1.500 A. D. in most of Europe. It lasted 
until the mid 1800's in parts of Germany. Toward the end of the period, 
say from 1 )00 A. D. on, the Feudal System began to break down, and the 
growth of the towns became more i ntensive. The break up of the Feudal 
System was caused by many things, perhaps the most important were : 
1. The r ise of money econo~. 
2 . An increase in trade and market. 
). The rise of nation and state to provide protection and justice.6 
Another event that took place later was the enclosure movement that also 
helped bring an end to feudalism. 
With the end of the Feudal System, free labor began to appear. This 
free labor moved to the cities and went to work many times in the manufac-
turing of goods. A great deal of the manufacturing at this time was done 
by the Guilds, which brings up the next form of labor management relations, 
the Master , Journeyman, and Apprentice, 
6c1ough and Ccle, ££· ~·, p. 29. 
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The Guilds 
The Guilds, as they pr ogressed through their history, set up the 
ba sis from which the modern arrangements of labor and management have 
evolved. A guild was set up as early as 1099 in Worms; it was a fisher-
mans guild, and in 1106 the cordwainers (shoemakers) of Wurzburg set up 
a craft guild.? 
The craft guilds were set up to control production (both quality 
and quantity), hours, wages, prices, rules, and apprenticeship regulations. 
The gradation within the guild were apprentice, journeyman, master; and 
the elected leaders of the guild were called wardens. For a boy to become 
an apprentice, his family would sign a written contract indenturing their 
@1~ht to glgv~n ygar gld ~gn to ~ ~~tQr , Appr@nt i ceqh1p tQo~ from two 
to twelve years, depending on the trade to be learned. The apprentice 
would live with the master and his family. The master would teach the 
apprentice the trade, and i n turn, the apprentice would work for the 
master. 
When the time of apprenticeship was over, the apprentice became a 
journeyman and was free to go seek work in any master's shop where he 
could find a job. The journeyman was free to change his employer any 
time he pleased , but he was required to give notice of his quiting. The 
journeyman was free to move about a t will and was free to marry if he had 
saved enough money to support a wife and family. 
In the early years of the guilds, it was easy for a journeyman to 
become a master; but as t ime went on, it became progressively harder. 
This occurred because as the guilds got stronger , the masters wanted to 
7~ .• p. 44. 
keep the profit of the trade by keeping the wages low. With low wages 
and high dues, necessary to become a master, the journeyman began to 
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form groups to raise wages and to get better working conditi ons . These 
organizations were often under the guise of a religious organization, but 
at this time (1500) the masters were powerful enough to get laws against 
strikes and combinations of workers. 
This can be said to be the start of what was to become the modern 
factory system, because as the guild masters became more powerful they 
took on the role of management and were no longer actual practicing 
workers of the trade, The guilds slowly changed and many of them became 
corporations, with what used to be the master now as the employer and 
owner. The journeyman now became the employee of the company. This 
break up of the guilds began about 1600 and continued until about 1750. 
By this time the remaining guilds had little power, and the change from 
a guild system to capitalism had taken place, 
The groups of journeymen that joined together to fight the oppres-
sion of the powerful masters were perhaps the first real start of labor 
unions even though a far cry from what unions are today. 
As early as 1400 a change had taken place in the relationship between 
labor and management in that the masters had to rely on the law to bring 
about their ends , no longer could a worker be beaten or killed by his 
master. Thus it can be said that as early as the fourteenth century 
labor law was being practiced. 
As noted above, strikes were illegal as were the organizations 
themselves, Even though the laws favored the masters, there was still 
the rule of law, and the law itself became more and more powerful as 
time went on. 
9 
'The Rise of Organized Labor 
The slave trade and the guilds died out at about the same time and 
labor moved into its modern era. Labor organizations were still illegal, 
In 1721 in the case of .The King!!· Journeymen-Taylors of Cambridge, the 
English courts ruled that the journeymen taylors were involved in a 
criminal conspiracy to raise their wage. 8 In 1809 a similar case took 
place in the United States, the People of the State of New York !!• James 
Melvin , or more commonly known as the Cordwainers ~· The basic point 
of this was that a combination of workers was unlawful,9 
Even with the English case as background, craft unions began to 
appear in the United States, the more important being the carpenters ( 1791 ) 
and the Cordwainer ( 1794) in Philadelphia. 1 0 By 1791 the printers and by 
1795 the tailors of Baltimore were organized, and by 1803 the New York 
Society of Journeymen Shipwrights was formed to mention just a few. 
These were first considered by the public as dangerous and unpatriotic, 
finding very little if any public support. 
These early unions called several strikes, The most important of 
which was the last of a series of strikes called by The Society of Master 
Cordwainers of the city of Philadelphia in 1805. Out of this strike came 
the above mentioned Cordwainer Case which declared that labor unions were 
an unlawful conspiracy, This case set a precedent that unions had to 
work and organize under for years to come, The Unions movement continued 
in this country even though it was hard for them to exist , 
8stephen J, Mueller and A. Howard ~ers, Labor Law and Legislation 
(Chicago, Illinois : South-Western Publishing Company, 1962), p. 10, 
9Ibid ,. p, 29. 
10Bining and Cochran , .!!!!· cit., pp. 249-250. 
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Management was able to maintain its almost absolute rule of labor 
unions until 1842 then, in that year , the Supreme Court of the state of 
Massachusetts ruled in the famous Commonwealth~· Hunt case that: 
(1) trade unions were not a criminal conspiracy and, therefore, lawful; 
(2) that to strike for a closed shop was not unlawful; and (3) that the 
union as a whole was not responsi ble for unlawful acts committed by its 
members. This decision together with laws passed in several states 
during the following few years gave the unions a great push forward. 
Between 1842 and 186o labor unions grew, and many national unions 
were formed, so that by 1860 there were twenty-six national trade union 
in the United States. 11 A national union is a union made up of several 
local unions of the same trade , An example would be the shoell!akers from 
several cities (local) banding together to form one nation wide union or 
national union. This number continued to grow until by 1866 there were 
thirty-two national trade unions. 12 
During the period from the end of the War Between the States to 
about 1900, labor made definite gains . During this period an at tempt 
was made to form a single large union to represent all labor regardless 
of trade . This was first tried by William H. Sylvis in 1866 when he 
organized The National Labor Union, but it failed. '!hen in 1869 the 
Knights of Labor was formed and rose to considerable strength under 
the leadership of Uriah S. Stevens and T. V. Powerly. The Knights of 
Labor reached its greatest s trength in 1886 and thereafter declined, 
The Knights did carry out some successful strikes and did organize 
11 Ibid., p. 253. 
12MuellerandM;yers, 2£· cit., p. 466. 
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many workers . 
In 1886 The American Feder a t i on of Labor was founded by Samuel 
Gompers . This loosely knit organization of craft-unions was the organi-
zation that came to s tay. The American Federation of Labor was set under 
Gompers in such a way that it was an exponent of laissez faire. Gompers 
and the A. F. of L. oppos ed government intervention in labor relations. 
Gompers believed that labor and management should be allowed to fight 
it out between themselves to see who would win. He believed the govern-
ment should be used to keep law and order. This "bread and butter" type 
of unionism caught on and stayed, because it was most compatible with 
the American way of life. 
During this same period , management gave up ground mainly in the 
areas of hours of work , child labor, and improved safety conditions. 
Management could no longer make a man or child work long hours (84 hours 
per week) under unsafe conditions without breaking the law, but it must 
be noted that poor conditions did still exist in 1900. By 1900 manage-
ment's God given right to manage as management saw fit was beginning to 
be questioned. Management's prerogative as to what they paid, who worked, 
and how long they worked were now no longer solely up to management. 
Labor 1900-1930 
Labor still had a long way to go in 1900 to reach its present 
statis. The period of time from 1900 to the present has been marked 
by the passage of much labor legislation and many court decisions to 
interpret these laws. 
One of the laws that came for review before the Supreme Court of 
the United States was a Utah law that limited underground lllin1ng to an 
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eight hour work day. 13 The court upheld this law in a decision i n the 
Holden :!:· Hardy case . This was one of t he few times the court sided 
with labor around the turn of the century, 1898. Sanford Cohen, a noted 
labor writer, has called the period from 1880 to 1930 "Judicial 
Conservatism, " 14 The courts handed down decisions both on legislation 
and various tactics used by unions in labor disputes. '!his paper will 
deal primaril y with the cases that were used to interpret the laws . 
The first law of the period to come under the eye of the courts was 
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act , The first case to see if labor was to be 
nder the anti-trust law was the Loewe !· Lawlor case better known as the 
~ Hatters case, This case came before the Supreme Court of the 
United States in 1908 . 15 In this case the court ruled that the latter 
had engaged in a secondary boycott and that this secondary boycott affected 
interstate commerce, Thus the combination (the Hatters) was in restraint 
of trade , The union then had to pay the company triple damages, '!his 
put labor unions under the control of the anti-trust law , 
In 1914 Congress passed the Clayton Act, which contained two sections, 
6 and 20, that were designed to remove labor from the anti-trust laws , 
Section 6 said in part, "the labor of a human being is not a commodity 
or an article of commerce, n16 thus, it was not under the anti-trust laws, 
Section 20 removed labor disputes from the area where a court injunction 
1JBining and Cochran, ££· cit. , p. 466, 
14Sanford Cohen, Labor Law (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill 
Book , Inc. , 1964), p. 1o8. 
1
.5)jerbert G. Heneman , Jr. and Dale Yoder, Labor Economics 
(Cincinnati , Ohio : South-Western Publishing Company, 1965), pp. 282-28). 
16u. s. , Clayton Act, Sec. 6. 
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could be issued. At the time this law was passed, it was held by l abor 
l eaders as the greatest step forward in labor history. Had this act stood 
the test of the courts, it would have cut into management's prerogatives 
in its dealings with the labor to a very great extent, but in 1921 in a 
6-J decis ion the Supreme Court of the United States handed down the 
decision i n the Duplex!· Deering case.17 This decision, for all practical 
purposes, voided sections 6 and 20. The dis sent was very sharp in this 
case with Justices Brandeis, Holmes, and Clarke in the dissent. It is 
interesting to note that in many of the labor decisions i n the early part 
of this century Holmes and Brandeis dissented, but as time has passed the 
law has changed, and their dissents are closer. to the law today than the 
majority opinions to whi ch they dissented . 
With the fall of sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act, ma.nagement 
could again obtain i njunctions in labor dis putes. Management still did 
not have to recognize unions, and management could discriminate against 
worker s for being members of a labor union. 
In 1917, the United States Supreme Court said that the "Yellow Dog " 
Contract was lawful in the Hitchman Coal and Coke Co. ~· Mitchell . In 
1927 the United States Supreme Court backed up the Duplex!· Deering 
decision with the decision in the ~ Cut Stone Company !· Journeyman 
Stone Cutters' Association in which the court still put unions under the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 
With the above decision and three others, ~ ! • United States, 
~ !· Kansas, and~!· Corrigan, the United States Supreme 
Court did a good job of cutting down most all state and federal laws that 
tried to get labor unions either reorganized or out from under the anti-
17cohen, 2E· cit., pp. 120-130. 
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trust laws. Up until the 1930's management had pretty much its own way 
mainly because of the general laissez-faire attitude of both the general 
public and the courts, but things began to change in the 1930's. 
1930 to the Present 
This period is when labor grew to prominence . During this period 
five major federal labor law acts have been passed with which this paper 
i s concerned. They are: The Railway labor Act of 1926, The Norris-
laGuardia Anti-Injunction Act, The National Relations labor Act of 1935 
(The Wanger Act), labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley 
Act), and the labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 
(landrum.-Griffin Act). 
The Railway labor Act of 1926, concerns itself only with those 
people working on interstate railroads. Even though this act was pas sed 
in 1926, i t is more in the spirit of the 19JO's than of the previous 
period. That is why it is included in this section. Its main purpose 
was to enc ourage bargaining with the government. In 1934 it was amended 
to include: first, that an employer could not coerce employees to join 
one union over another, second, that a company could not give funds to 
help any labor union, third, it outlawed the "Yellow Dog" Contract , 
fourth , it outlawed as terms of employment that the worker must join a 
union. This law was the forerunner of the National labor Relations Act 
of 1935. 
The Norris-laGuardia Anti-Injunction Act passed congress in 19)2. 
The main purpose of this act was to spell out to the courts what consti-
tutes a labor dispute, under what conditions an injunction could be used, 
and that "Yellow Dog" Contracts were not enforceable in court. The act 
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also declared t hat congress went on record as saying that a worker was 
free to join or not to join any labor organi zation of his choosing. 
The i ssuance of i n junctions i n labor disputes was not made illegal 
in the act, but a definate se t of rules was put forth under which one 
could be issued , The Act basically s tated that injunctions could be 
issued when: 
(1) Unlawful acts are threatened and will be committed 
unless res trained, or unlawful acts are being committed 
and will continue unless restrained; ( 2) Substantial and 
irreparable damage to the complainants pr operty will 
follow; (3) Greater injury will be i nflicted upon the 
complainant by denial or r el ief than will be inflicted 
upon the defendants by the granting of r elief; (4) The 
complainant has no other adequate remedy at law; (5) 
The public officer charged with protecting complainant'fs 
property are unable or unwilling to furnish protection . 
This act partly destroyed one of management's strongest weapons in fight-
ing strikes for before this time management could .get an injunction for 
just about any reason. This act did not come under the eye of the courts 
until 1937. and by that time the judicial tide had turned in favor of 
labor . 
The Na tional Labor Relations Ac t of 1935 is the act around which 
todays labor relations are centered. The act can be broken into three 
major areas. First , it gave t he employees rights in their relati ons with 
management. In section 7 the act s tates : "Employees shall have the right 
to self-organizations, to form , join, or assist labor organizations, to 
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and 
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the 
right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent 
18Ibid • • p. 143 . 
\ 
that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership 
in a l abor organization a s a condition of employment. " 
Section 8 al so gives the employee certain rights . These rights 
16 
are listed as five unfair l abor practices. They are that an employer 
cannot (1) interfere with, res train or coerce employees in the exercise 
of the rights guaranteed in section 7, (2) dominate or interfere with the 
formation or administration of any labor organization or contributes 
f i nancial or other support to i t , (J) discriminate in regard to hire, or 
tenure of employment, or any term or condition of employment to encourage 
or discourage membershi p in any labor organization, (4) to discharge or 
otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges 
or given testimony under thi s Act , (5) refuse to bargain Qolleotively 
with the representat ives of his employees.19 
The National Labor Relati ons Board is responsible for the administra-
tion of the Act and the unfai r l abor practice come under their ajudication. 
Certain of these will be looked at more closely later in this paper. 
The second part of the NLRA sets up the procedures by which a union 
becomes a bargaining agent f or a certain group of workers. This part of 
the act also sets up the National Labor Relations Board and charged it 
with carrying out the procedures f or representation. The board originally 
had three members but now i t has five. They are appointed by the 
President with the advice and consent of the United States Senate. 
The third part of the act impowered the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB) to hear wifair labor practice cases and issue cease and 
desist orders when they found an employer guilty of an unfair labor 
19u. S. , National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Section 8(A). 
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practice. The NLRB was given no direct power to enforce their cease and 
desist orders, but instead they mus t go to the United States Circuit Courts 
to get their orders enforced. 
One can see that if this ac t were held to be constitutional, manage-
ment would lose a great deal of power in dealing with labor. The test in 
the courts was not long in coming . The case was Jones and Laughlin Steel 
Corporation!· National~ Relations Board. 
In 1937 in the Jones and Laughlin case, the NLRA was to see if it 
could s tand the test of the Supreme Court. It must be stated that at 
this time in history the Court was under much pressure from both sides. 
President Roosevelt was putting pressure on the Court by stating that 
he wanted a different type of court set-up, and with a large majority of 
the voters having put him back i n the White House in 1936, the Court had 
reason to think about his request. On the other hand was the fact that 
nearly sixty of the nation' s most prominent attorneys had signed a state-
ment to the effect that they believed that the NLRA was unconstitutiona1. 20 -./ 
Because of these reasons, plus the burden of past precedents--many of 
them very recent--the Court found itself sharply divided. 
The case started when the Jones and laughlin Steel Corporation 
fired ten members of the Beaver Valley Lodge No. 200 of the Amalgamated 
Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers of America for union activity. 
Thus, the company engaged in an unfair labor practice, 21 This activity 
is illegal under Section 8(a)1 which states that it is not legal "to 
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the 
20
cohen, ~· cit.,pp. 151-152. 
21 1tleller and JVers, ~· cit., p. 336. 
r ights guaranteed i n Section 7. n 22 Section 7 basically states that 
wor kers can join a l abor organization of their own choosing. This 
activity of the company is also in violation of Section 8(a) 3 which 
states that "discrimination i n r egard to hire or tenure of employment 
or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage 
membership in any l abor organization" 23 is an unfair labor practice, 
The case came to the Court as a result of the National Labor 
Relations Board's (NLRB) s tatement that the above parts of Section 8 
had been violated, The Circuit Court denied enforcement of the NLRB's 
orders, and that there had been subsequent denial of certiorari by the 
Circuit Court of Appeals, thus the NLRB appealed to the Supreme Court, 
an~ tho Supreme Court did grant certiorari. 
The Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation argued that the NLRA was 
an act that was passed under the commerce regulating powers of the 
Constitution and that regulation of labor relations was not interstate 
commerce, The Company also sta t ed in its behalf that the ten workers 
in question were not under the jurisdiction of the NLRA because they 
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were involved in production, and production is not subject to regulation 
by the federal government, In furthering its argument, the Company went 
on to state that it believed the NLRA to be unconstitutional under Article 
III, Section 2, and the Fifth and Seventh Amendments of the Constitution. 24 
Article III, Section 2, basically states the areas in which the federal 
government has power. The Company argued that the federal government had 
no power to legislate ·in the area under consideration, 
22Ibid , , pp. 339-34o. 
23Ibid, 
24Cohen, !!.E• cit, , p, 1,54, 
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The Fifth Amendment is the amendment containing the "due process 
clause. " The Company ar gued that they ware deprived of due process of 
l aw by the NLRA. 
The Company also claimed that they had bean deprived of the rights 
held under the Seventh Amendment, because in the National Labor Relation 
Board's ruling on the case they told the Company to give the workers in 
question back pay, and this back-pay order was given without a trial by 
jury. 
At no time did the Company say that they had not discriminated 
against the workers for union activities. The decision handed down by 
Chief Justice Charles Evan Hughes was a sweeping victory for the NLRB. 
The decision was handed down on April 12, 1937, It was a 5-4 
decision written by Chief Justice Hughes, In the decision, Chief Justice 
Hughes sat down four major poi nts: 
First, the NLRA was i n r egulation of commerce, Although the NLRA 
was not directly in regulation of commerce, the Constitution gives the 
Congress the power to l egisl ate in area s that are "affecting commerce, u25 
This part of the decision gives the Act a very wide scope, 
Second, the Court ruled that the Company had committed unfair labor 
practices against the ten worker s and that the Company must comply with 
the NLRB ruling, including the back-pay regulation. 26 
Third, the Court ruled that the workers were involved in interstate 
commerce even though they were involved in production because the pro-
25Muellar and MYers , 2£· cit., p, JJ9. 
26class Notes from Economics 125, November 6, 1964, Utah State 
University, Logan, Utah (in possession of the writer), 
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duction process is involved in the "stream of commerce . n 27 
Fourth, the NLRA was not unconstitutional under any of the amendments 
of the Consti t ution. 
It is this decision that se t down the constitutionality of the 
basic labor l aw that is stil l in effect today. 
With the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act 
proven, plus several other court cases that removed the unions from the 
jurisdiction of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, management's power went 
steadily down hill for twelve years . 
Between the National Labor Relations Act and the other court cases, 
management lost the power to not recognize unions, the power of laying 
off a union worker for the reason of being in a union, the power to have 
company supported unions, and the power to not bargain with unions. The 
court also broadened its power by moving into the area of manufacturing 
by saying it was interstate commerce. This brought a great number of 
workers under the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act. They 
heretofore had not been considered under the provision of the Act. 
The reason f or this was that World War II had just ended and this 
was the first year unions could strike. In 1946, public opinion was 
against organized labor because of the many strikes which had taken 
place that year, 28 One of the major strikes which took place in 1946 
was in the coal mining industry. This strike helped turn the general 
public against organized labor, because it was called in the middle of 
the winter and many people went cold. There were also strikes in other 
27MUeller and MYers, 2E· cit., p. J41. 
28Herbert R. Northrup and Gordon F. Bloom, Government and Labor: 
The Role of Government in Union-Management Relations (Homewood, Illinois: 
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1963), pp. 67-70 . 
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vital industries the same year, such as a police strike in Boston, 
When the people went to the polls in 1946, they made it quite clear 
that they wanted the power of organized labor decreased, A Republican 
Congress was sent to Washington i n 1947, and on June 23 , 1947, it passed 
the Taft-Hartley Act over the veto of President Truman . 
The act wa s an amendment and an addition to the National. Labor 
Relations Act of 1935 . The Taft-Hartley Act as it is best known is 
formally called the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, This Act 
has three important parts, The first part is section 8(b) . 
Section B(b) was placed in the Taft-Hartley Act to offset the five 
unfair labor practices that employers were prevented from perpetrating 
against unions by provisions of the Wagner Act, 
Provisions of Section 8(b) 
There are seven unfair labor practices in section B(b), There were 
only six i n the original Taf t-Hartley Act, The seventh was added in 1959. 
Section 8(b)1 makes it an unfair labor practice to restrain or coerce 
employees in the exercis e of the right to bargain collectively through 
a union of the employees' own choosing. 29 Section 8(b)1 was set up to 
stop the strong-arm tactics of unions, The union would bring in people 
to help i n their organizational campaigns, and these helpers would intimi-
date worker s into voting for the union. This intimidation is the reason 
for Section 8(b)1 , 
Section 8(b)2 ma kes it illegal to coerce an employer into discrimi-
nating against employees to make these employees enter into a union 
security agreement unless the union has a security contract that is legal 
29ill!!·' p. 88. 
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under the Act. 3° Under this section of the Act, a closed shop is an 
illegal union security contract. If a union can get a union sho p agree-
ment with an employer , the new worker does not have to join the union 
until JO days after his hi r i ng. This JO days wa s decreased to 7 days 
in the constructi on industry by the Landrum-Griffin Act. Section 8(b) 2 
also contains the provisions governing the requirements for union shop 
agreements which are too lengthy to be covered in this report. 
It is an unfair labor prac t i ce on the part of a union if the union 
refuses to bargain collectively with an employer under Section 8{b) J , 
This section was set up to stop a union from coming to the bargaining 
table wi th "take it or leave it" proposals)1 The words "bargain in 
good faith" appear in this Section , and the meaning of this phrase bas 
been the key to many court decisions. This also ties in very closely 
with section 8{d) , 
Section 8(d) states "to bar gain collectively is the performance 
of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the 
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, 
.. , but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession," This point shall come 
under more consideration later in this paper.32 
Section 8(b)4 deals with illegal strikes and boycotts. It outlaws 
secondary boycotts as a means for unions to gain their ends, It also 
JOMueller and Myers, 2£· cit., p. 462. 
31 Northrup arrl EI.oom, 2£· cit,, p. 91. 
32u. S., Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Section 8(d). 
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makes it illegal for a uni on to force an employer to bargain with that 
union if it is not the recognized bargaining agent. Another part of 
Section 8(b) 4 makes the jurisdictional strike illegal. This particular 
section has been the subject of many National Labor Relation Board deci-
sions because, linked with Section 10(k), which gives the National Labor 
Relations Board the power to settle jurisdictional disputes, many 
employers have brought such cases to the National Labor Relations Board. 
Most jurisdictional disputes take place in the construction industry. 
Section 8(b)5 makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to 
charge excessive dues and initiation fees. This section was placed in 
the Act to stop unions that have union shop agreements from taking 
advantage of the position . 
Section 8(b)6 makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to "cause 
or attempt to cause an employer to pay or deliver or agree to pay or 
deliver any money or other thi ngs of value, in the nature of an exaction, 
for services which are not performed or not to be performed. ,33 This 
section is an attempt to stop the practice called "featherbedding." 
Section 8(b)7 was not part of the original Taft-Hartley Act. It 
was added in 1959 as part of the Landrum-Griffin Act. Section 8(b)7 
is a restriction on the use of picketing.34 It restricts picketing in 
three specific instances. First, it is illegal for one union to picket 
an employer who has already agreed to bargain with another union. This 
ties in with part of Section 8(b)4. 
The second part of Section 8(b)7 states that it is an unfair labor 
33Northrup and Bloom, 2E· cit., p. 91. 
34The Bureau of National Affairs, The Labor Reform Law (Washington, 
D. C.: Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 1959), pp. 96-98. 
practice to use picketing Rgainst an employer who has held a valid 
electi on •d thin the preceding 12 months. 
The third part of this section makes it illegal for a union to 
picket an unorganized employer for more than 30 days before filing an 
election petition with t he National Labor Relations Board. 
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Sec tion 8(b)7 was added to the list of unfair labor practices mainly 
as a result of practices used by the Teamsters Union ,35 These practices 
were uncovered by the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in 
the Labor Management Field, under the leadership of Senator John L. 
McCellan (Democrat, Arkansas). 
Section 8( b) gives management back some of the power it, .. 
1935, but more than anything it puts the government even moro cle• ply 
into the area of labor relations. The NLRB was also charged with the 
administration of this section. 
The second part of the Act dealt with strikes that concern national 
security, In thi s part of t he Act the President is given the power to 
injoin a strike for up to 80 days i f the strike endangers the national 
security. 
This part of the Act gave management some power, for if a company 
knew a stri e might be called and believed it would endanger national 
security, it would be injoined. The company would not have to bargain 
quite so carefully. 
The third major part of this act is section 14(b), This section 
gives the s tates the right to pass right-to-work laws, A right-to-work 
law can vary a great deal; but basically they are laws that provide for 
lesser union security under the federal law, that is a state may pass 
35 Cohen, 2£• cit., p. 192. 
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a l aw that makes one type or all types of union security illegal. 
Section 14(b) could have given management many of its lost powers 
i n dealing with unions, but only 19 states have right-to-work laws, and 
of that number, none are really what might be called indus trial states, 
It mus t also be noted that in many states that have right-to-work laws 
the l aw has not been too effective, 
The Taft-Hartley Act also lost some of its possible impact when the 
United States Supreme Court made rulings in two 1953 cases36 that, for 
most purposes, voided section 8(b)6 - the anti-featherbedding section. 
As noted above , the Taft-Hartley Act did give management back some 
powers, but not as many as one might expect. 
The last of the labor acts is the Labor lhnagement Reporting and 
Disclosure Act of 1959, better known as the Landrum-Griffin Act. It was 
designed to protect the individual union member and small employer from 
the abuses of unscrupulous union leaders, 
Beginning in 1956 the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities 
in the Labor or lhnagement Field, under the leadership of John L. McCellan 
(Democrat , Arkansas), began an i nvestigation into the activities of the 
leaders of the Teamsters' Union.J7 The Committee found many malpractices 
had been perpetrated by Teamsters' leaders , The investigation discovered 
that many of the union leaders were guilty of taking bribes in exchange 
for "sweetheart contracts," and tha t these union leaders were also using 
picketing, secondary boycotts, and extortion on small employers to gain 
)6American Newspaper Publisher Association v. NLRB )45 U, S. 100 and 
NLRB v, Gamble Enterprises, )45 U, S, 117. 
37Northrup am moom, 2-E· cit., p. 146. 
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their ends. More impor tant. the union leaders were misusing 1" ·n funds 
and not giving the union members the right to voice opinions against t his 
leadership. 
The evidence brought forth qy the McCellan committee prompted Robert 
P. Griffin, Republican Representa tive of Michigan, and Phillip M. Landrum, 
Democratic Representative from Georgia, to co-sponsor legislation to 
correct the problem. The bill they co-sponsored, The Labor-Management 
Report and Disclosure Act of 1959 or Landrum-Griffin Act, was signed into 
law by Dwight D. Eisenhower on September 14, 1959. lbe Landrum-Griffin 
Act provided for the following: (1) that each member have the right to 
nominate, vote, and speak in union election, and it set regulations on 
the terms of office of leader and the way elections are to be carried 
out; (2) that union report their finances, and employers to report any 
pay given to union leaders; (3) it requires unions that have trusteeship 
to report on thei r affairs ; (4) it prohibited Communists and recently 
convicted criminals from holding office in a union. In 1965 the United 
States Supreme Court ruled that a Communist could hold office in a labor 
union; (5) it contains seven amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act. There 
are three main amendments.38 The first sets down guide lines as to which 
sector of government, federal or state, has jurisdiction over certain 
labor disputes. This amendment gives the states more power in labor 
cases because in labor disputes where the National Labor Relations Board 
does not have the time or resources to do the job, the state can be 
given the power in many of the cases. lbe vast majority of these cases 
involve small employers. 
38cohen, ~·cit., pp. 474-506. 
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The second of these major amendments strengthens the rules against 
secondary boycotts and certain types of picketing. 
In the third major amendment, the rules on unionism of cons truction 
workers were changed so that a worker in the construction industry must 
join the union within 7 days of his hire instead of the normal )0 days 
in other industries.39 This was dono because of the seasonal and short 
time involved with individual employers in construction work. The major 
ideas behind this act are to cut the power of union leaders, and give the 
member his rights. 
The employer is put into a slightly better bargaining position by 
the Act . The small employers are given better protection under the Act 
by rea son of the increased power of the states to have jurisdiction over 
labor disputes. It also helped management by restricting the picketing 
by a union that is not the bargaining agent with that company. 
This gives management a stronger ability to resist union organiza-
tional campaigns. The Act hurts some companies in that "sweetheart 
contracts", a contract where the company is given privileges that are 
not in most other contracts , such as no strike clauses or a lower wage. 
The Act has helped management to some extent. 
The past review of the history of labor and labor law will give the 
insight needed to look at some of the current problems, but first a 
review of a series of cases to show the way in which the court can change 
over a relatively short period of time. This is done because it will 
add to the analysis used later in this paper. For this the case 
surroun:ling the so-called Thornhill Doctrine will be used. This doctrine 
was set down as a result of the United States Supreme Court decision in 
39Northrup am moom, !!.2· cit., p. 146. 
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the case of Thornhill ! · State of Alabama. The doctrine set forth the 
idea that picketing is a manifes tation of free speech. 
In 1921 the Supreme Cour t handed down decisions in the American 
Steel Foundries case and the Truax !· Corrigan case, both of which 
drastically limited the right of organized labor to engage in picke ting 
activities,40 The decisions in these two cas es gave impe tus to many 
s tates to enact anti-picketing laws, Most of these state laws prohibited 
one or more of the following types of picketing: outsider, violent, 
massed, fraudulent, and secondary picketing, Most of these laws were 
set up to protect the employer from loss of property or to stop general 
violence. 
In 1923 the statQ of Alabama put a law into effect that proh:l,bited 
all picketing. 41 This law made it a misdemeanor to engage in any type 
of picketing. The Thornhill cas e is the case that tests the constitu-
tionality of this Alabama statute. The decision in this cas e is consi dered 
to be a landmark decision in Labor la~< . 
Section }448 of the State Code of Alabama reads as follows : 
Sec. }448 . Loitering or picketing forbidden.--Any person or 
persons, who , without a jus t cause or l egal excuse therefore, 
go near to or loiter about the premises or place of business 
of any ot her person , firm, corporation, or an association of 
people, engaged in a lawful business , for the purpose, or 
with t he i ntent of influencing, of inducing other per sons not 
to trade with , buy from, sell to, have business dealings with, 
or be employed by such persons , firm, corporation, or associa-
tion of persons, fo r the purpose of hindering, delaying, or 
interfering with or injuring any lawful business or enterprise 
or another, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor; but nothing 
herei n shall prevent any per son from soliciting trade or busi-
ness for a competitive busi ness ,42 
4oMueller and ~ers, ~· cit . , p. 198. 
41Ibid. 
42cohen, ~· cit., p. 280. 
Byron Thornhill was a uni on l eader in the Brown Wood Preserving 
Company, a pickle- making company. In 1937 the union went on strike. 
The uni on comprised all but four of the approximately one hundred 
employees of the plant . Due to Thornhill's leadership in the strike, 
he was tried under Section 3448, He was found guilty by the Alabama 
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state courts. Hence, he appealed to the federal courts on the grounds 
that Section 3448 was uncons t i tutional under the provisions of the First 
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment. The provision of the First 
Amendment that the United States cannot abridge the right of freedom of 
speech, and the Fourteenth Amendment that says that States cannot deny 
the rights of the Constitution to any person, were the ground on which 
he based his claim. Both the United States District Court and the United 
States Circuit Court of Appeals found Mr. Thornhill "guilty of loitering 
and picketing as charged in the complaint, "43 and the section was ruled 
constitutional. Thus, Mr. Thornhill took his case to the United States 
Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court in a 8- 1 decision voted that Section 3448 was 
unconstitutional. The main points of testimony brought out by the 
Supreme Court are: first, that the picketing was done in a peaceful 
manner and there were only two picket posts manned by six to eight men, 
24 hours a day.44 These picketing posts were at the employees' entrance 
to the plant and not on any public road. Second, the picketing took 
place on company property, but the picketers were never asked to leave 
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the company property. The third and most important testimony was that 
of two witnesses, a Clarence Simpson and a J . M. Walden. Simpson was 
a non-union employee of the Brown Wood Preserving Company. On the day 
that the company scheduled the plant to resume operations , even though 
the strike was s till on, Simpson went to work. As he approached the 
employees' entrance, Thornhill came up to him and stated that the union 
was still on s trike, and the union did not want anybody to go to work. 
Therefore, Simpson went home. 
Simpson testified that at no time had Thornhill or any other union 
member threatened him, either at the time of the strike or a s to the 
testimony given before the courts . Walden testified that he saw the 
meeting between Simpson and Thornl!Ul and tll;!t at no time dj.d it /!ppear 
to him that 'l.b.ornhill was unfriendly toward Simpson and that he heard 
no harsh words between the men. 
With this tes timony in the background, the court made the following 
point s: Fir s t, Section )448 was unconstitutional under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments . Second, the most important, picketing was con-
sidered speech and a form of dissemination of information, thus equating 
free speech and picketing. 45 This idea that picketing and free speech go 
hand in hand in what is known as the 'l.b.ornhill Doctrine. 
The fall of the Thornhill Doctrine began the year after the decision 
was handed down.ll6 In 1941 the Supreme Court ruled that where violence 
i s involved in the picketing the courts could use injunctions to stop it. 
Two cases in the late 194<l' s set down that stranger picketing and off- the-
45Ibid., pp. 199-203. 
ll6Cohen , 2£· cit., pp. 286-306. 
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job-site picketing were illegal . 
In 1947 the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act, although not aimed 
at picketing, lis t ed a number of unfair union practices, and it was 
clearly implied t hat unions were to be put in check to a certain extent 
at leas t . In 1950 three cases came down from the Supreme Court. All 
were under the unfair labor practice issues of the Taft-Hartley Act, and 
all i nvolved picketing. In all three cases the court ruled that picket-
ing was unlawful if used to perpetrate an unfair labor practice. 
I n 1957 the Supreme Court in the Vogt case states that if picketing 
was in restraint of trade i t was illegal. 
In 1959 the Landrlllli-Griffin Act was passed. As part of this act 
a new section was added to the unfair labor practices that unions can 
perpetrate against employers, This section places many restrictions upon 
picketing, 
By this time it is easy to see that the Thornhill Doctrine has been 
largely abandoned, or as Justice William 0. Douglas observes: "The Court 
has come full circle and the state courts and state legislatures are free 
to permit or suppress a picket line for any reason other than a blanket 
policy against picketing • .,47 
Before going on one thing should be stated. First, that the 
historical background given in this chapter shows that management has 
lost a great deal to labor in the past, and that only looking back to 
what has gone on before can one have some idea of what may yet come, 
Thus this historical background is very important first, because it 
gives the background needed to understand the next chapters , and second, 
47Ibid .• p . 291 . 
because i t will be used to help analyze the present position of the 
management's rights as discussed in the next chapters, 
With this background, this paper will review two recent labor 
cases and discuss their impact and importance. 
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CHAPTER III 
This chapter will review two current labor cases that have caused 
much controversy. 
The first case to be reviewed is the Textile Workers Union of America 
v . Darl i ngton Manufacturing Company. This ca se wa s also argued as the 
National Labor Rel ations Board!· Darlingt on Manufacturing Company . 
When both ca ses went to the United States Supreme Court , they were 
settled by the same decision. This , being the former of t he above two 
decisions, is listed as )80US263 in the Court record . This case is 
one in a series of deci sions both by the National Labor Relations Board 
and the courts dealing with management's prerogatives in the closing of 
plants. The case was adjudicated by the National Labor Relations Board, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and the United 
States Supreme Court. All three of these groups came up with different 
points of view of the case. 
Background 
The Darlington Manufacturi ng Company was a company that operated a 
single textile mill in the state of South Carolina. Darlington in turn 
was partly owned by Deering Milliken, Inc. Deering Milliken and Company 
owned 41 per cent of the stock in Darlington until 1960 when it and 
Cotwool Ma nufacturing Corporati on merged.1 Cotwool held 18 per cent of 
Darlington 's stock; thus the merged corporation, Derring Milliken, Inc,, 
1Textile Workers v, Darlington Company. 380 U, S. 263 (1965) . 
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owned 59 per eent of Darlington's s tock. Deering Milliken, Inc. was 
controlled by the Milliken family with Roger Milliken as the leader and 
also as president of Darlington. The Millikens also control Deering 
Milliken, Inc., and hold 6 per cent of Darlington's stock, 2 thus giving 
the Milliken family 65 per cent control of Darlington. The Milliken 
family also owned 16 other textile manufacturers, The other manufacturers 
had 26 plants and all marketed the goods through Deering Milliken, Inc. 
In March 1956 the Textile Wor kers Union began an organizational 
campaign at Darlington. During the organizational campaign the management 
threatened to close down the plant if the union won the election for 
representation to collective bargaining. The company also used other 
means to discredit the union. Nevertheless, on September 6, 1956 , an 
election was held and the union won by a very close margin. 
On September 12, 1956, Roger Milliken called a meeting of the board 
of directors of Darlington to consider shutting down the plant.3 This 
was only 6 days after the union had won the election. At the meeting , 
the board of directors decided to close the plant and sell the equipment. 
The stockholders approved the action of the board on October 17, 1956; 
as of that date, Darlington quit taking any, new orders for goods and 
began the process of phasing out existing orders. B,y the end of November, 
the plant had been entirely shut down, and in December of 19.56 the company 
had an auction and sold the plant's machinery and equipment. Thus, 
Darlington ceased to exist. 
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The Char ges 
After the plant was closed , the union filed charges with the 
National Labor Relations Board. Thes e charges claimed that Darlington 
had committed no less than 3 unfair labor practices . The union charged 
that Darlington had violated sections 8(a)1 and 8(a)3 of the National 
Labor Relations Act of 1935 i n the closing of the plant. Section 8(a)1 
ma kes it an unfair labor practice "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce 
employees in the exerci se of the rights gu.aranteed in section 7. n4 
Section 7 gives workers the r ight to organize and do collective bargaining. 
Section 8(a)3 states that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer 
"by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any 
term or oondition o£ employment, to encourage or di~oour~gu momberahip 
in any labor organization!'5 The above two u¢'air labor practices , 
according to the union, were perpetuated in the ordering of the plant 
to be closed. The union also charged that the company had violated 
section 8(a )5 i n not bargaining with the union after it won the election. 
After the decision to close the plant, union and management did meet, 
but no bargaining took place. 
The National Labor Relations Board gave its decision on the case 
in 1962. The NLRB was split 4-1 in this case, with board member Rodgers 
as the dissenter. The NLRB found that the closure of the mill was in 
violation of secti on 8(a) 3 on the grounds that Darlington President, 
Roger Milliken, closed the plant because of his anti-union feeling. 
Milliken stated in testimony before the trial examiner: 
4u. S. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, section 8(a)1. 
5Ibid., section 8(a)3 . 
"I felt that as a r esult of the campai gn that had been 
conducted and the promises and s tatements made in these 
letters that had been distributed (favoring unionization) 
tha t if before we had had some hope, po ssible hope of 
achieving compet i tive (cos t) •• . by taking advantage of 
na>r machinery that was baing put in, that this hope had 
diminished as a result of the election because a majori~y 
of the employees had vot ed i n favor of the union . • • " 
The board said t ha t closing the plant without talking to the union to 
sea what their proposals ware was a violation of section 8(a)5. Thus, 
if the shutting down of the plant was an illegal act , the lay-off of the 
employee was in violation of sec tion 8(a)1 . Thus, the National Labor 
Relations Board had found the company guilty on all the counts brought 
against them by the union. The board put teeth into its decision by 
finding that Deering Milliken, controlled by the Milliken family and 
the owner of the controlling stock in Darlington, was t o be held liable 
for the unfair labor practices that Darlington had committed. This was 
so, the board ruled , because Darlington was part of a single integrated 
employer group, the single employer being Deering Milliken . Thus, Deering 
Milliken had only shut down part of i ts business and was in violation 
of the NLRA because this part was shut down for discriminatory reasons. 
The board ordered Deering Milliken to place those employees that 
wanted to work in other Deering Milliken plants on preferential hiring 
lists for those plants and to give back pay to all Darlington employees 
that were discharged until they could find equivalent work. 
Back pay can amount to a great deal of money. In the Kohler case, 
it amounted to almost 2 million dollars. The Board cited Fiberboard 
(379(U. 5.) 203) as a precedent for its decision. In the Fiberboard case 
6Textile Workers v. Darlington Company, 380 U, S. 263 (1965). 
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the Uni ted States Supreme Court ruled that an empl oyer must bar gain 
over decisions that are of a purely business nature i f t hey affec t the 
union. The Fiberboard case involved sub-contracting of maintenance 
work. 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in a 3- 2 decision did not grant 
the NLRB an enforc ement order. The Court of Appeals stated that even 
though Deering Milliken was a single employer they had the right to 
close part or all of t heir plant regardless of motives, anti-union, 
or otherwise. 
The National . Labor Relations Board appealed the decision of the 
Court of Appeals to the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court 
renc:!.erell its decision on Ha:roh 29, 1995. Th:i.s was a 7-9 c;!ecision with 
Justice Stewart and Justice Goldberg not taking part in the decision. 
Jus tice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Justice Harlan divided the decision into two parts. In the first 
part he wrote concerning the charge of a violation of section 8(a)3 and 
the subsequent violation of section 8 (a)1 in the closing of the plant. 
The court ruled that , because of the complete liquidation of the company 
in such a manner that the business was of no use to the management, 
there had been no unfair labor prac t i ce committed. The court stated: 
An employer may not go completely out of business without 
running afoul of the Labor Relations Act i f such action is 
pr ompted by a desire to avoid unionization. Given the 
Board ' s findi ngs on the issue of motive, acceptance of this 
contention would carry the day for the Board's conclusion that 
the closing of this plant ;ms an unfair l abor pr actice, even 
on the assumpt ion that furlington is to be regarded as an 
independent unrelented employer. A proposition that a single 
businessman cannot choose to go out of business if he wants 
to would represent such a startling innovation that it should 
not be entertained without the clearest manifestation of 
legislative intent or unequivocal judicial precedent so con-
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straining the Labor Relation Act. We find neither. 7 
The court also ztated tha t as far as i t could see no current labor law 
had ever meant t o sto p a business from closing . The court said that 
the NLRA did not compel a per son to become or remain a worker for a 
par ticular company; thus, a company was not compelled to come into exist.. 
onc e or to remain in existence as an employer, 
The union made three contentions. They felt t hat the closure was 
only a lockout, or temporary shut down. The court ruled that because of 
the complet enes s of the closing and the sale of the entire plant, there 
was no intent of ever r eopening . Thus it could not be a lockout or shut 
down. The court ha s ruled that discriminatory lockout s were unlawi'ul 
in several ca s es, but complete and lasting closures never had been unlaw-
f ul. TI1e union also contended that the sale of the pl ant and the equiP-
ment was a resal o of plan~ issue, The court ruled that because of the 
piece-meal sale of plant and equipment, it was not a resa.le . It has been 
held by the courts that in the sale of a complete plant the new owner 
can be held for the unfair labor practices of the former owner even if 
the plant was shut down between owners, Thi s was set forth in National 
Labor Relations Board v, New 1-ndrid Manufacturing Company , but even in 
this case the actual closure was not held to be an unfair labor practice. 
The third union charge was that Darlington was a "runaway shop." The 
court ruled that i t was not a "runaway shop" becaus e first, the work 
done at Darlington was not shifted to another plant; second, no new plant 
was built to replace the clo sed one; an:l third, no benefit was gained by 
the company by closing, 
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In the second part of the decision the court s tates that Darlington 
was a single independent employer: " The closing of an entire business, 
evan though discriminatory, ends the employer-employee relationship."8 
The court then wont on to disagree with the Circuit Court on its 
point concerning "partial closing . " The court cited three cases, the first 
being a ca se in which it was held that the discharge of the entire work 
force and the hiring of new per s onnel to discourage unions was in 
violat i on of the NLRA . 9 The others deal with the closing of a part or 
department of a single business . One was the discriminatory discharge 
of the personnel in the wholesale department of a laundry. 10 The other 
involved the discriminatory discontinuation of a shuttle service connect-
;l.n f-1 a mi],:!J.;~q ;l.nstaUa tion am a bus te~nal. 11 In l;>ot h cases the 
partial shut down discouraged unionization of the rest of the business, 
To clarify i ts point the court goes on to s tate: 
While we have spoken in terms of a "partial closing" in the 
context of the Board's finding that Darlington was part of a 
l a r ger single enterprise controlled by the Milliken family, 
we do not mean to suggest that an organizational integration 
of plants or corporations is a necessary prerequisite to the 
establishment of such a violation of section 8(a)3. If the 
per sons exercising control over a plant that is being clos ed 
for anti-union reasons (1) have an interest in another 
business, whether or not affiliated with or engaged in the 
same line of commercial activity a s the clo s ed plant, or 
sufficient substantiality to give promise of their reaping 
8Ibid. 
9Labor Board v, Norma Mining Corp ., 206 F, 2d 38. 
10Labor Board v. Savoy Laundry, 327 F. 2d 370. 
11rabor Board v . Missouri Transit Co., 250 F. 2d 262 . 
a benefit from the discouragement of unionization i n that 
business ; (2) ac t to clos e their plant wi th the purpose of 
produc i ng such a result; and (3) occupy a relationship to 
the other business which makes i t realistically fore s ee-
able that its employees will persist in organizational 
ac t ivities" we think an unfair labor practice has been 
made out,1 c. 
The court conclud'es by remanding its decision to the Circuit 
Court. 
4o 
It is interesting that the Court did not consider the violation of 
section 8(a)5 directly, probably because by rule the closure would 
be illegal on the grounds for which a violation of this section would 
be founded or destroyed because one cannot bargain at a plant that 
does not exist. 
The decision in this case and the series of which it is the most 
important part to date help define an area of management prerogatives 
heretofore left untouched by the NLRB and the Courts. Before the 
decisions in this area, it was commonly held that management had the 
prerogatives to close at any time for any rea son. 
As for Darlington, it won i t s case in the courts; but the more 
far-reaching points are yet to be discussed. 
The reason for the importance placed on the Darlington case is 
that it is the decision or point a t which the courts ruled in favor 
of management. The controversy surrounding the NLRB's and the Court's 
movement into this area of management's prerogatives and the stand of 
management's prerogatives as to plant closings will be a part of the 
next chapter of this paper, 
12Textile Workers v . Darlington Company. 380 U. S. 263 (1965). 
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The General Electric Case 
Thi s case deals with management's prerogatives as t o choo sing the 
manner i n which it will do collective bar gaining , 
The full name of the case is General Electric Company and Interna-
tional Union of Electrical, Radio, and M9.chine ~lorkers, AFL-CIO case, a 
decision that was r endered on Dec ember 16, 1964 by the NLRB. Thi s 
decision i s one of the most recent in a series handed down by the 
National Labor Relations Board which have caused much controversy over 
the Board's i nterpretation of certain unfair labor practices and the 
definition of an unfai r labor prac tice under the provisions of the 
National Labor Relations Act as amended, 
Background 
To understand this decision, a l ook at the bargaining techniques of 
the General Electric Company and the Company's general attitude toward 
labor unions is imperative. The General Electric Company (GE) employed 
approximately 250,000 employees at the time of the dispute {1960), of 
whom about 120,000 were in organized bargaining units. The International 
Union of Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO (IUE) was by 
far the largest single union wi th whom General Electric dealt. It 
represented some 70,000 GE workers, 13 The IUE is an outgrowth of the 
Uni ted Electrical Work Union (UE). This outgrowth came about i n 1950 
when the UE was ous t ed from the CIO for alleged Communist domination. 
13National Labor Relations Board, Intermediate Report: General 
Electric and International Union of Electrical , Radio, and M9.chine 
Workers, AFL-CIO , prepared by Arthur Leff (Washington, D. C.: 
National Labor Relations Board , 1963), p. 3 . 
The IUE wa s formed from the part of the United Electrical 11or k Union 
that wanted to s tay in the CI O. Besides the IUE, General Electric 
had some 10,000 workers still i n the UE with whom i t bargained. The 
approximately 4o,OOO other organized workers were divided among more 
than 100 other unions. 
In 196o the IUE had 105 bar gaining units with General Electric, 
and almost all of t hes e units were involved i n the dispute . 14 The 
reason for this i s that GE and the IUE, by mutual acquiesc ence, 
bar gained on a na t ional or multi-unit basis. General Electric was the 
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first company to engage in thi s type of bargaining when the Company and 
the IUE signed their first contract in Sept~mber, 1950. 15 These national 
contracts are for general items of bargaining, and in most cases the 
individual bargaining units may add any special i tern i n local bargaining 
that are consi stent with the national contract. 
The 1950 contract was followed by renewal agreements in 1951, 1952, 
1954, and 1955. The 1955 contrac t was a five-year contract. In the 
contracts presented during the years from 1950 to 196o, the Company 
wa s known for bei ng fair in its approach to the terms of the contracts. 
The reason for this fairness, as General Electric saw i t, was the way in 
which GE went about its bargaining and how it arrived at its bargaining 
provisions . 
The evaluation of General Electric's bargaining policies dates back 
to 1946, for it was in 1946 that General Electric was jolted by a very 
bitter strike. 16 General Electric had gone to the bargaining table with 
14Ibid , 
15Ibid,. p. 4. 
16Ibid,, pp. 6-7. 
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an offer of a 10 cants an hour wage increase, but by the time the strike 
wa s over, the Company had to give an 13t cents an hour wage increase to 
its employees . This strike forced GE t o taka a long look at its approach 
to employee and union rela tions. 
The development of a new a pproach to General Electric's labor problems 
came under the guidance of Lemuel R. Boulware, who s erved than and for 
many years after (but not in 1960) as General Electric's Vice-President 
of Relations Service, The approach that Boulware developed has become 
known a s "boulwareism". 17 
The new approach at General Electric entailed all the principles of 
personnel relations one learns in the textbooks . 18 One of the main 
pr i nciples is that a company should give employees job satisfaction, and 
in this way gain the loyalty and support of employees by showing the 
employees that the goals of the Company and their goals are the same 
and that the Company is a good employer b~ause it looks out for the 
bes t interests of its workers. General Electric's approach was to make 
the employees feel and understand that it ,was the Company ' s aim to do the 
right thing voluntarily. The idea behind this was to show the worker 
that he did not need a labor or ganization to obtain what was his fair 
share of rights. This approach is one of the points upon which the 
National Labor Relations Board had to deciQ.e as to whether an unfair 
labor practice had been per petrated against the Union, The Board's 
17Sanford Cohen, Labor Law (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill 
Books, Inc., 1964) , p, 203. 
18Leonard R. Sayles and George Strauss, Personnel: The Human 
Problems of Management (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey : 1964), p. 111, 
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ruli ng on this approach will be discussed later in this paper. 
Under this approach t o bar gaining, General Electric t ook upon itself 
t o s eek out what was r ight for its employees. This was done by year-
r ound research into all a spects of labor relations. 19 The research 
included s tudies into business conditions, competitive factors, and 
economic trends in general. General Electric also ga thered its own 
information from meetings with employees, direct discussion between 
supervisors and employees, and the publishing of statements in both 
union and company publications to survey the needs and desires of its 
employees. Also, at the beginning of each contract bargaining, General 
Electric would listen to and evaluate the union' s demands and add the 
information thus obtained to their total research. Armed with the 
facts of their research, General Electric would make a determination 
of what was "right". 20 lhen General Electric made an offer to the 
union , and this offer included everything the company deemed just , 
This offer wa s made with the idea that, unless the union could point 
out where the company r esearch was wrong, this was to be a "take-it-
or-leave-it" offer . The Company repeatedly emphasized to its employees 
and the union the fact that it would not depart from its offer for 
anything other than f ac t s showing the offer to be wrong, and that 
threat of s trike or a strike itself would not change their position 
because t o the Company any change in their position would be "wrong". 21 
In an attempt to be effective, General Electric based its general 
19National labor Relations Board, Intermediate Report, loc, cit , 
20Ibid, , pp. 6-10 . 
21Ibid. 
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bargaining philosophy on an elaborate system of management-employee 
communications which entailed the use of plant newspapers, daily news 
digests, employee bulletins, letters to employees' homes, television and 
radio broadcasts , and other mass media communication as well as, perhaps 
most important, a great deal of per sonal contacts . As stated previously 
the Company used almost every type of personnel relations tactics 
possible, 
Two other points of t his background are also important, First, 
in deali ng with over 100 different unions, General Electric offered each 
the same basic programs. This was based on ,the idea that no union should 
get more favorable treatment than any other,, thus showing the fairness 
of the Company to all its workers.22 
Second, about half of General Electric's employees were not in labor 
organiz~tions, and from time to time either representation or decertifi-
cation elections were held, At these times, the Company made it quite 
clear that i t did not like unions, and it used its communication system 
to put this idea across, 23 This system was ,.also used in the .196o 
bargaining period as i t had been employed in the past. It may be noted 
that at no time did the National Labor Relations Board consider the use 
of this communication system as an unfair labor practice until 196o. 
It is also important to note that the Company gave the non-union workers 
the same basic programs that the union workers were given. With this 
background of the bargaining philosophy of the Company, it is easy to 
22Ibid., pp. 29-30. 
23Ibid.' p. 14. 
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see that trouble was bound to occur in 1960 . 
The Negotiations of 1960 
In early 1960 both GE and the IUE were preparing for negotiations . 24 
The IUE sent to each of its workers employed by General Electric a ballot 
listing 19 demands. Each worker was asked to list the demands in order 
of priority. According to the ballots job security ranked first and 
economic benefits ranked second. Through research which had been done, 
the Company also had a good idea that job security and higher wages 
would be among the Union's major demands. The Company believed that 
the 1955 contract had been too lenient in respect to the wage issue. 
Th@ reasoq for this was th~t due to the inflation of the late 1950's 
the cost-of-living escalator clause in the 1955 contract had cost the 
Company a great deal more than it had expected. Thus, the Company, 
knowing that the economic improvements to be offered in 1960 would not 
be too great, embarked upon a campaign designed to build employee 
support for its positions. This campaign was called "Building Employee 
Understanding in 1960", and General Electric used its communication 
system to the utmost. 25 
In early 1960 pre-negotiation meetings were held to exchange 
information. On June 13, 1960, formal negotiations began. 26 From the 
very outset of negotiations it was apparent to both sides that it was 
going to be a long, hard-fought battle before terms of a new contract 
would be reached. On the first day of negotiations the IUE challenged 
24Ibid .• 
25Ibid • • 
26Ibid 
--·· 
pp. 13-17. 
p. 10 . 
pp. 13-1 8. 
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the Company on its stand on personal accident insurance . vii thout 
bargaining the point with the Union, GE went out on its own and arranged 
with an insurance company for an accidental death or dismemberment group 
insurance policy under which all individual General Electric employees 
who desir ed to par ticipate could do so. 27 The Union objected to this 
insurance plan on four main points: 28 first, t he Union was paying the 
cos t of the plan for its members ; second, the cost as reported by the 
Company wa s too high and could be lowered by obtaining a blanket policy 
covering the whole Union; thi rd, t he plan decreased the Union's ability 
to negotia te on other phases of the contra~t; fourth, and mos t important, 
in offering t~e insuranc e on a take-it-or-+,eave-it basis General Electric 
was discrediting the Union and thus undermtning good faith collective 
bargaining. This point was one of the iss11es brought out by the National 
Labor Relations Board in its decision in the case. 
In the next few meetings following June 1J, the IUE set down its 
demands. These demands were basically a s follows: 29 (1) a Jt percent 
annual wage i ncrease, (2) a cost-of-living escalation clause, (J ) more 
paid holidays, (4) adjustments due to auto~tion, (5) equal pay for equal 
work, (6) unemployment benefi ts, (7) separ~tion pay, (11) improvement in 
the pension ~an, and (1 2) several other minor non-economical matters. 
As soon as the Company obtained the U~ion demands, it began to 
27Ibid .• p. 15 
28Ibid. 
29Ibid •• p. 16 . 
present its case directly t o the workers . General Electric used its 
communication sys tem to cut nearly every Union demand. On July 1, 
196o, a Company newsletter was sent to all employees. In this news-
l etter the Company stated that if the IUE's demands were met the added 
cost "could destroy thousands upon thousands of jobs. ,30 This type of 
Company communicati on continued throughout the entire bargaining period 
despite heavy Union protest . 
From June 13 until the middle of July both sides talked in general 
terms without getting down to any of the basic issues. By mid-July the 
bargaining, centered around employment security problems, began in earnest. 
This bargaining continued until early August. On August 1, 196o, the 
IUE informed GE that if a contract was not agreed upon by October 1, 1960, 
it would call a strike.31 Talks continued through August, and during 
this time other Union demands were considered. Finally, on August 30 , 
196o, General Electric set down what is cal:j.ed a "fair but firm offer". 
This offer was in keeping with General Electric's "Boulwareism" bargain-
ing . Thus, in reality this offer was final unless the IUE could bring up 
facts which would force the Company to change their position on one 
point or another. General Electric's offer was considerably less than 
Union demands , The offer contained:J2 (1) , a 3 percent increase at its 
outset with a 4 percent increase 18 months later, and the oontraot was 
to cover a three-year period with no cost-of-living escalator clause; 
(2) certain benefits if employees were laid .off; (3) a loan plan and an 
JOibid. , p. 17-18. 
31 Ibid •• p. 25. 
32Ibid • • pp . 29-30. 
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emergency aid plan; and (4) improvements in both pension and insurance 
plans. 
From August JO to September 8 the bargaining continued without any 
progress toward a contract, On September 8 , 1960 , negotiations were 
suspended until September 20, 196o , because of the IUE national conven-
tion. During the convention period, General Electric launched a campaign 
to induce local offi cials and individual employees to influence other 
employees not to strike. 
On September 20 , 196o, negotiations proceeded with General Electric 
declaring that its offer wa s on the table and that the IUE could take it 
or leave it.JJ The next day the Federal Conciliation and Mediation 
Servig~ entered intp the negotiation ~t the req~est 9f the IUE. Also, 
on this day the IUE filed charges with the National labor Relations 
Board, against General Electric for failure to bargain in good faith. 
Two other events occurred in late September that came into play in 
the later National Labor Relations Board decision,J4 These events were; 
first, the Company's rejection of the idea that the terms of the 1955-
196o contract be continued until a new contract agreement was signed, 
and second, General Electric' s refusal to give the union information 
relevant to cost and other bargaining issues, The Union filed its second 
charge against the Company with the NLRB stating that this withholding 
of information was an unfair labor practice, 
On October 2, 196o, the Union went on strike, but talks . still 
JJibid .• p. 51. 
J4Ibid., pp. 51-52. 
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continued. Shortly after the strike began , General Elec tric began to 
bargain directly with some of the IUE l ocals , and in two instances the 
Company offe r ed the locals bett er terms than it had offered the national 
union. General Electric continued local bargaining until October 19, 
196o, at which time it declared that the negotiations had reached an 
impasse and that the IUE should capitulate, The Union capitulated that 
day. The Union gave up the strike becaus e it had been a total failure, 
This failure had resul ted because many of the Union worker s continued 
to work through the strike, The strike officially ended on October 22, 
1960; on November 10, 196o , a new three-year contract was signed between 
General Electric and the IUE. This new three-year contract followed 
tq~ Com~ny ' ~ off~r al~st to the l~tter. 
In the post-strike period, the IUE filed additional charges against 
General Electric, The Union charged that:35 (1) the Company's overall 
approach to bargaining was illegal; ( 2) bargaining with locals during 
the time of strike was illegal; (3) the strike was an unfair labor 
practice strike, and 20 workers who had been replaced during the stri ke 
should be reinstated and given back pay. 
The Decision 
The charges filed by the IUE stated that the Company had viola ted 
Sect ion 8(a) 1, ), and 5 of the National Labor Relations Act of 19)5 .36 
35Nati onal Labor Relations Board , Decision: General Electric 
Company ! • International Union of Electrical, Radio, and Machine 
Wo r kers, AFL-CIO (Washington, D. C. : National Labor Relations Board, 
1964)' p, 1. 
J6Ibid . , 1-18, 
Section 8(a )1 basically states that i t is illegal for an employer to 
res train or coerce employees in their right to bargain collecti vely.37 
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Section 8(a) 3 basically states that it is illegal f or an employer to 
discriminate agains t an employee because of union membership. 38 Section 
8(a )5 basical~y s tates that it i s illegal for an employer to refuse to 
bargain collec t i vely.39 
With these provisions of the l aw i n mind, the National Labor 
Relations Board began hearings on July 24, 1961, under the direction 
of trial examiner Arthur Leff. The hearings were closed on January 29, 
1963. The basic points of evidence brought, out i n these hearings were 
previously stated i n the first two parts of this paper. On April 1, 
1963, the trial examiner 's report was filed with the National Labor 
Relations Board. This report was s trongly in the Union's favor .40 
On December 16, 1964 , the National Labor Relations Board, in a 4-1 
decision, that General Electric had not bargained in good faith and had, 
therefore, violated Sections 8(a)1 and 5 .41 The National Labor Rela-
t ions Board stated that General Electric had bargained i n bad faith i n 
that: (1) it did not furnish the Union with the i nformati on it reques ted, 
( 2) it attempted to bargai n with individual union locals while bargaining 
with the national Union, {3) it presented . the insurance plan on a take-
it-or-leave-it basis, and (4) i t s overall approach to collective 
37cohen , ££· cit,, pp. 446-447. 
38Ibid. 
39Ibid. 
40National Labor Relations Board, Decision, loc , cit. 
41Ibid, 
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bargaining was not consistent with good faith bargaining. 
Finding the Company guilty of bad faith bargaining , the National 
Labor Relations Board ordered General EJ.ectric to: (1) supply the IUE 
with the information requested, (2) reinstate the 20 workers who had 
been laid off and give them back pay, (J) cease using its present form 
of bargaining. 
This decision is more far-reaching than are the orders agains t 
General Electric because for the first time the National Labor Relations 
Board stated that techniques of bargaining are subject to approval or 
disapproval by the Board . General EJ.ectric, along with others , believe 
that the Board's decision on the Company's overall technique of bargain-
believed by some that this decision takes away the rights of the indivi-
dual workers in that it requires an employer to deal with the employees 
through the Union, not the Union through the employee. 
The Company has a ppealed the decision of the National labor Rela-
tions Board to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,42 The deci sion of 
the Court of Appeals should be rendered by the end of 1967 and both sides 
have stated that if the ruling goes against them, they will then go to 
the United States Supreme Court for its decision in the case. Both 
sides are attempting to get public opinion to support them. At the 
present time , General EJ.ectric seems to have obtained most of the public 
support, but Frank W. McCulloch, chairman of the National labor Relations 
42nFJ.ood of Comment in Nation 1 s Press Supports Company in NLRB 
Case, " Relations Newsletter (New York, New York: General Electric 
Company, February 1, 1965), p. 1. 
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Board, has given several speeches saying, in effect, that the Board is 
being misinterpreted on this decision, 
The next r 'qr will deal with controversy surrounding this 
decision , and what it possibly could mean to management's prerogatives. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE CONTROVERSY AND MANAGEMENT 
Prerogatives Present Position 
Darlington Case, From the outset of the Darlington decision, there 
was a great deal of controversy. One writer even went so far ·a s to say: 
"that going out of business , under current labor laws, may be even more 
ha zardous than keeping a plant open. " 1 
The main point of contention i n this cas e is, does management have 
the right to close a plant without fear of running the wrath of the NLRB? 
The Board said that if the closing was for discriminatory reasons then 
the company has committed an unfair labor practice, but this ruling was 
based on the idea that Darlington was a part of a larger company; namely, 
Deering Milliken, It would have been interesting to see what the outcome 
of the board would have been if Darlington had been, in their opinion, a 
single business as both courts said it was. This is probably the key to 
decisions, for as the Supreme Court said, to say that a single business 
cannot close without committing an unfair labor practice is too great a 
change from what the congress meant in the framing of the Nation Labor 
Relations Act. 
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision, but after the Circuit Court's 
decision, Frank W. McCulloch, chairman of the Nation Labor Relations 
Board, said: 
"However in Darlington Mfg. Co. where the employer sold an entire 
plant to avoid dealing with the union, the Board did not order it 
1M. R. Lefkoe, "The NLRB's New, Rough Line," Fortune, November, 
196), p . 164. 
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to repurchase and r eprove the facility , but did direct the employer 
to offer its laid-off employees positions at other of its nearby 
plants, to place them on certa i n preferential hiring lists, and 
to pay moving expenses and back pay . ., z 
The quotation from the chai rman of the NLRB is interesting in that the 
chairman does talk of repurcha sing and reopening of the plant. He might 
have meant that the Board could have gone farther than it did or even 
that it may have consi dered making Deering Milliken reopen Darlington. 
This would have been an even greater departure from the past and shows 
that the NLRB at least may have thought about completely striping man-
agement of its right t o close f or discriminatory reasons, 
It is interesting to note that in October of 1965 McCulloch gave a 
speech in which he said, in reference to the Darlington case, that the 
public had misinterpreted the Board and that the Board was taking cases 
only one at a time and was not out to set presidence with each case it 
decided, 
The reason for this softer line was probably caused by the court's 
refusal to uphold the Board' s decision and the several articles written 
in the period just prior to the court decision. Articles with such titles 
as: Fortune's "The NLRB 1 s, New, Rough Line,"3 Iron Age's "The Attack on 
funagements Rights, ., IJ. Dun• s Review's "New Policy for the NLRB, .,5 and 
2Frank W, HcCulloch, Chairman of NLRB, An Evaluation of the Remedies 
Available to the National Labor Relations Board-Is there Need for 
Legislative or Administrative Change?, An address given before the 
Federal Bar Association, Labor Law Committee, The Ambassador Hotel, Los 
Angeles, California: June 1:3 , 1964. 
3Lefkoe , loc, cit . 
lj."The Attack on funagement Rights," Iron Age, January 21, 1965, 
p. :38. 
5Thomas R. Brook, "New Policy for the NLRB?", Dun's Review and 
Modern Industry, July, 1965, p. 56. 
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Nations Businesses, "Let s Stop labor Board's Unfair Practices. "6 All 
these attacked the Board for its infringement on management's prerogatives 
and mos t made direct r eference to the Board' s ruli ng i n the Darlington 
case. 
Has the criticism and the Court's decision changed the NLRB's stand 
on closures? I t i s felt t hat the answer to this question could be yes. 
The reason for t his is that in two recent decisions the NLRB ha s backed 
off t o a certain extent. In the Pierce Governor Co. case ,? the company 
moved its plant 32 miles. 'Ibis company talked with the union and said 
it would consider for transfer each old employee who applied and would 
give them there old seniority if they were hired, but the company stated 
that it would not guarantee jobs for all the old workers. The company 
also stated that it would not recognize the union at the new plant unless 
it won represet;~ta tion. The union then charged the company with failure 
to bargain, The Board said that the company had carried out its obliga-
tion to the worker at t he old plant, and because a majority of the old 
plant's employees did not want to be transferred to the new plant, the 
company did not have to recognize the union, 
The other case may be even more important. In the MCLoughlin Mfg . 8 
~ the company closed the plant when no agreement could be reached with 
the union over a change in a seniority clause that caused excessive cost 
to the company. Just before the closing, an out-of-state community per-
6
stuart Rothman, "Lets' Stop labor Boarct•s Unfair Practices, " 
Nations Business, May, 1965, p. 34. 
7"Two NLRB Rulings on Bargaining in Plant Removal Cases, " Bureau 
of National Affairs: Labor Relations Reporter, May 8, 1967, pp:-T:27 
8Ibid. 
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suaded the company to move their plant there. The company did not tell 
the union of the r elocation . The union filed charges , the NLRB ruled 
that the company should have told the union of the change in plans, this 
was a technical refusal to bargain but no remedial order was necessary. 
The board stated that, because the new plant was being built by the 
community on the stipulation that l ocal people be hired, and that there 
was no sign that the old employees would want to transfer, no order was 
required, Both these cases have been handed down this year. 
Thus, in two cases, that are in some respects similar to Darlington, 
the NLRB has rendered a seemingly less harsh decision from managements 
point of view. Where does that leave us today with respect to managements 
pr@ro&ati ve§ in closure~ and the Qontroversy over the O~rlinston decision? 
The controversy over the case itself has died down to a great extent 
since the Supreme Court's decision. The controversy over the Board's 
ruling, is still carried forth when management wants to make the point 
that the NLRB is trying t o take away management 1 s rights . 
All this leads to >~hat management's prerogatives in plant closing 
are today. As stat ed earlier in this paper, by use of the Thornhill case 
and the cases surroundi ng i t , labor law, as it is known today, in most 
instances is derived from a series of cases. Thus, what is being looked 
at is the result of a series of cases surrounding the Darlington case. 
Before the Darlington case, management could not close a plant and 
then transfer the work to another plant . 9 It could not close one plant 
and open a new plant i n another town to replace the old one. 10 It could 
9NLRB v . New Madrid Mfg . Co., 215 F. 2d 908, 914, 
10NLRB v. Preston Feed Corp. , 309 F. 2d 346, and Labor Board v. 
Wallick198 F. 2d 477. 
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not close part of the pl ant that was unionized and keep the rest open, 11 
It could no t close a plant, until the worker r enounced the union, and then 
reopen the plant. 12 After the Darl i ngton decision, what are management's 
prerogatives? A single owner can have his plant closed by management a t 
any time, for any reason, anti-union or not , If the company is an inter-
graded multi-plant concern, then management must cope with the following 
rules, In closing a plant management must be able to show that i t has 
gained no benefit by closing a unionized plant, Nor can management , in 
a mul t i-plant company, use closure or threat of closure to discourage 
unionized plants , 
From the stand point of the multi-plant company, the Supreme Court 
spelled out what it must do to stay out of trouble, Thus , if the Iarling-
ton case did anything, it cut the power of the multi-plant company by the 
setting forth of these rules, of course, both single and multi-plant 
managers still come under all the pre-Darlington decisions as far as 
partial closing , lock out, etc. are concerned, 
As for single business, its prerogatives have not changed. Then 
why, one might a sk, "!las the NLRB softened 7" The answer would be, as 
s tated above, the decision of the Court did not go along with the Board, 
the criticism of the NLRB was great, Now a third point should be brought 
out, In the period of time while the Darlington case was in the Courts, 
management began to bargain with the union over plant closure, the reason 
for this was that management did not know whioh way the Courts were going 
to come out on the case, Thus with the other case in the background and 
11NLRB v. Savoy laundry, 327 F. 2d 370 , and labor Board v. Missouri 
Transit Co., 250 F. 2d 261. 
12NLRB v. Norma Mining Corp, , 206 F. 2d 38. 
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Darlington with its rules, management is bargaining over plant closure, 
and the NLRB is saying that by doing this management is meeting its 
obligation under the NLRA. 
Management gained back none of the prerogatives it los t before the 
Darling ton decision and probably lost some ground in the Darlington de-
cision, but to a greater or lesser extent management now bargains over 
plant closure. Thus , it could be said that another area that used to be 
part of management's right is now gone. 
The General Electric Case 
This cas e differs from Darlington in that it is the first case to 
arise in this area , thus there is no series of cases to draw on. Some 
cases have arisen in the area of general approaches to bargaining; these 
will be discussed in this section, but before getting to the general 
effect of the case, a look at the controversy surrounding it should be 
taken. 
The controversy in this case surrounds two main points, one the 
right of an employer to present his side of a labor issue to his employees 
and the other the broad i nterpretation the Board made of section 8(d) of 
the National Labor Relations Act of 193~. 
The General Electric Company is the mo s t . upset over, what it calls , 
the right of "free speech" that it claims the ,Board has taken away. Virgil 
B. Day, General Electric 's Vice-President of Management Development and 
Employee Relations services, stated: "This challenge to management's 
right to communicati on with employees could be disas trous. The central 
issue, of course , is the right of free speech,,and the employees' right to 
know management's views as well as the union view about business facts 
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affecting their jobs." 1 3 On another occasion Day sta tad : "1rfe believe 
t ha t employees have t he right to know where the Company stands on 
controversial issues between their management and their union--and 
that they have t he right to hear it f rom the Company, not someone alsa, n14 
As noted in the pr evious chapter, one concept that Boulwarism is 
basad on is the communication between employees and management. This 
idea finds good foundation in the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 
for section 8(c) s tates: 
Free speech. The expressing of any view, argument, or opinion, 
or the dissemination thereof , whether in written, printed, graphic, 
or visual form shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair 
labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if such 
expression contains no threat r;>f reprisal or force or promise of 
benafi t . 15 
Several di££erent law publications hav9 attadk~d th~ Board Oft thai~ 
interpretation of section 8(c) such as : The Duke law Journal,16 Temple 
law Quarta~1 7 and the Michigan Law Raviaw.1 8 The above publications 
all s tate that the Board has put itself in a hard to defend position. 
In t he Michigan law Review i t is stated that the Boards know there will 
13virgil B. Day, Vice-President Management Development and Employee 
Relations Services, General Electric Company, labor Management Relations 
in a NeHly Competitive World, An address before the 1964 Midwinter Personnel 
Conference, American Management Association, Chicago, Illinois: February 
14, 1964. 
14virgil B. Day, Vice-President , Management Development and Employee 
Relati ons , General Company, Communicat~ns-A Neglected Key to Competitive 
Progress , An address before the Annual Conference of the International 
Council of Industrial Editors, Denver, Colorado: June 18, 1963. 
15u, s., National labor Relations Act of 1935, Section 8(c). 
16David L. Banetar , "GE-Uniqua Situation or Broad Impact," labor Law 
Journal, March, 1966 , p. 166 . 
17Ibid., p. 166-167. 
18Ibid. 
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be a great deal of adverse r eaction to t he decision, but the Board feels 
that this reaction will not be enough to get thei r decision overthrown. 
One other point the criti cs of this part of the decision make is 
that General Electric is being deprived of its rights under the First 
Amendment of the Constituti on. 
The defense put up by the Board on the above criticism will be 
reviewed after a discussion of the criticism that surrounds the decision 
a s to its interpretation of section 8(d). This is done because the Board 
defends itself on a total stand saying that the total approach is unlawful, 
not the parts. It almost says that what is lawful in part or by itself 
is not lawful when put together in a t otal plan of bargaining. 
Section 8 (d), a s reviewed in chapter II of this paper, basically 
s tates that good faith bargaining does not oblige management to meet union 
proposals with counterproposals or concession. 
The tri al Examiners report stat ed that section 8(d) "was not designed 
a s a shield to protect surface bargaining, " ,this report was upheld by the 
Board. Thus, the Board is saying t hat an employer cannot bargain with a 
take-it-or-leave-it attitude even i f the employer states that he will 
change his position if evidence can be brought forth to show where his 
stand is unreaJ,is tic. It is easy t o see why the critics state that the 
Board's decision forces employers to meet proposals with counterproposals 
or concession. Thus, these critics state the only type of bargaining 
that can s tand the wrath of the NLRB is some type of give-and-take 
bargaining . 
One of the most out spoken critics of this part of the Board's decision 
is the noted management-relation author , Herbert R, Northrup, also one 
time General Electric's labor relations consultant. The period of time 
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he was a consultant for GE could have very easily overlaped Lemuel R. 
Boulware's period at GE. Northrup says , in effect, that GE's approach 
to labor relations is, perhaps, one of the best; and the NLRB has dealt 
GE a great injustice. 
Northrup has some court presidence to back his position as far as 
GE's violation of Section B(a)5 (good faith bargaining) and its connection 
with Section B(d) , because the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated 
in the Fitzgerald Mills case : 19 
"It i s not the proper function of the Board or the courts to 
determine the proper resolution of differences arising during 
the course of negotiations. ay necessity, a company may begin 
negotiations with certain firmly set convictions on the matters 
subject to negotiations, and is not obligated to yield." 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in the Herman Sausage 
~,20 
"If the insis tence is genuinely and sincerely held, i t is not mere 
window dressing, it may be maintained forever even though it pro-
duces a stalemate. Deep conviction firmly held from which no 
withdrawal will be made may be more than the traditional opening 
gambit of a labor controversy. It may be both the right of the 
citizen and essential to our economic legal system of free 
collective bargaining. " 
It should be n9ted that it was on this point {section B(d)) that the 
Board ~ember L~edon di ssented, thus, making the 4-.1 decision. With all 
this well-founded critic ism what does the Board say in its own behalf? 
The Board's most used defense is that General Electric is a special case, 
The Board s tates in its 1965 report that General Electric had developed 
a unique bargaining technique . 21 Frank W. McCulloch, Chairman of the 
19NLRB v. Fitzgerald Mills, 313 F. 2d 260 (1963) . 
20NLRB v . Herman Sausage Co., 275 F. 2d 229 (1960). 
21 Thirtieth Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board for 
the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1965 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government 
Printing Office, 1966), p. 69. 
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NLRB, had applied accept ed princi pl es to a unique situation. 22 The 
princi ples that McCulloch speaks of are the court rulings in the Truitt 
Manufacturing case. 23 This ruling f ound the employer gui lty of not 
bargaining in good faith , but t hi s case did not condemn a total approach 
t o bargaining, Saul J. Jaffe , t he associate solictor of the NLRB, has 
sai d that a sit~tion like that at General Electric may perhaps never 
recur. Thus, the Board i s found standing on two main points one that 
GE is a special case and that only by looking at the total effect of GE 
labor relations approach can it be condemned, 
The unique situation of the Board can come under partial attack in 
that in 1965 the Board ruled in two cases24 and in 1966 in one25 other 
that a firm stand at the bargaining table is unlawful . In all these 
cases the Board basically s tated tha t the employers were not bargaining. 
The major question now i s what will the Courts rule in the case? 
There are basically three po ssibilities. First that the Courts will 
uphold the NLRB on every point in the case , This seems unlikely, but if 
it did happen management would losl' a great deal of its power. It would 
lo se much power in the area of communications with its employees. It 
would lose the power to depart f rom the traditional bargaining method . 
It would also lose regulation over i t s barga~ning techniques. 
22Frank W. McCulloch, Chairman NLRB, The Polio~, the Purpose1 and the Philosophy of the NLRB a s Revealed i n Decision Tren s, A speech g~ven 
before the Texax Manufacturers Association, 43rd Annual Conference, Fort 
Worth, Texas, October 28, 1965. 
23NLRB v. Truitt~· Co. , 351 U. S, 149, (1956) , 
24Memorial Consultants Inc ., 153 NLRB No. 3, 1965, and H. K. Porter 
Company, Inc,, 153 NLRB No, 119,(1965). 
25stark Ceramics, Inc, , 155 NLRB No. 120, (1966), 
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On the other hand the second possible court ruling would be to tell 
the !bard it was wrong. This would be a victory for management's pre-
r oga tives in that none of the above res trictions would be placed on 
them . 
But the third possi ble ruling of the court is, perhaps , the most 
likely to occur. That is the cour t will rule on some points for General 
Electric and aga i ns t others . I t seems that a possible ruling would be 
to rule against the company on t he charges of failure to furnish inform-
ation and the bypass ing of the nat ional union, while ruling for the 
company on firm bargaining and overall attitude or approach to labor 
management relations. This would be a victory for Boulwarism and 
management in general because the two latter charges are the most impor-
tant to management's prerogati ves . It should be s tated that the above 
is just a possibility, perhaps a more possible, ruling by the courts 
but not a predicti on of what will happen, for as shown earlier in this 
paper, in the Thornhill cas e, what seems most probable for the courts 
to do one day is not what will happen the next. '!bus, until the courts 
do rule on this case the problems brought forth remain unsolved. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has attempted to show how, throughout his tory, labor 
ha s gained power; and how management has lo st prerogatives in its 
dealing with labor. The historical review and the review of the basic 
statutes of labor law ·put forth the background needed to study two 
area s of currant labor controversy. The first was that of plant closure, 
the Darlington case was used to put forth the ideas of both the National 
Labor Relations Board and the federal courts in this area. After a 
review of the case and the controversy, a conclusion was made that 
management, in general, has come to the point where it believes that 
it is easier to bargain with the union over the closing of a plant and 
make whatever concessions are within reason. By bargaining with the 
union, it greatly lessens the chance of committing an unfair labor 
practice. Thus, it can be concluded that management lost its pre-
rogatives to close at will, but i t must be remembered that this only 
applies in multi-plant companies. Single plant companies can close 
at will. for any reason because a s the Court stated closing a total 
business ends the employer-employee relationships; thereby, making it 
impossible to perpetuate an unfair labor pr~ctice, 
The second area of current controversy was that caused by the 
NLRB condemning the approach to labor-relations used by the General 
Electric Company. This approach is commonly called Boulwarism. An 
attempt was made to show that the decision of the Board is bard to 
defend in the areas that deal with section 8(c) (free speech) and 
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section 8(d) ( proposal s and concessions) and that there i s a reasonable 
probability that the court will not uphold the Board in these areas , 
but t his remains to be seen. IT the Courts uphold the Board, then 
management's prerogatives would suffer a great blow, 
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